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It is now widely recognized Chat one of the most serious problems of
Centrally Planned Economies is the shortage of inputs or more generally unre-
liability of supplier behavior. Supplies typically don't arrive on time, and
even when they do, they often turn out to be not quite what they were supposed
to have been. Even more strikingly, this seems to happen even when aggregate
statistics show that aggregate plan targets for the production of those par-
ticular goods have bee'n met.
The connection between this phenomenon and other disfunctional aspects of
these economies like input hoarding and quality deterioration have been
recognized for quite some time now (for an early study of the Soviet system
from this point of view, see Berliner (1957)). But the problem does not seem
to have been alleviated since then and Alec Nove was writing in 1983 that:
"There is an increasing feeling among Soviet economists
themselves that drastic changes are essential. It is
not just that growth has slowed down, that plans are not
fulfilled. Shortages have become more serious, dis-
equilibria and imbalances, which have always existed,
have reached intolerable levels, and by intolerable I
mean that the leadership itself is alarmed and is not
prepared to tolerate them (though it has yet to devise
a cure)" [Nove, 1983].
The problem is therefore both serious and apparently insoluable. Our aim
in this paper is to suggest a systemic explanation of this phenomenon in a
model of the principal-agent type.
There have been earlier attempts to explain this phenomenon in the
principal-agent type framework (see for example Keren (1972) and Moore
(1974)). However, these studies limit themselves to showing that if there is
asymmetric information between the central planner and the person who directly
controls production it may be optimal for the central planner to give out pro-
2duction targets which cannot always be met. This is certainly true but Lt
does not explain why this leads to such devastating consequences for centrally
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planned economies. After all, asymmetric information between the principal
and the agent in the production sector is also a characteristic of capitalist
economies.
Our analysis, by contrast, takes as its starting point a number of
3(stylized) institutional features of existing centrally planned economies.
These are:
Fl: That firms in centrally planned systems are directly controlled by
ministers and not by the central planning body;
F2: Each ministry controls the production of a very large number of
goods especially considering the fact that in general goods produced
at different locations or at different times are not going to be
perfect substitutes;
F3: The central planner controls the ministers by a system of rewards and
punishments. These rewards (and punishments) are decided on the
basis of the performance of ministers according to certain aggregate
statistics like the total output of a certain product;
F4: The allocation system is quite rigid in the sense that normally
buyers are only allowed to buy from a few fixed sources of supply.
The thesis of this paper is that Fl to FA along with the fact that the
central planner cannot directly observe the production decisions taken by
ministers can explain the kind of supply behavior found in these countries.
The logic of our explanation is best understood by considering the example
of a hypothetical ice cream plant. The plant produces ice cream using milk
and fresh fruits. Since both these ingredients are highly perishable the
plant needs to have the right combination of milk and fruits at the right time.
If the milk supplier is erratic and not well coordinated with the supply of
fruits lots of milk and fruits will be wasted. This will be especially true
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if, along the lines of our stylized fact F4, the manager of the ice cream
plant cannot at the spur of the moment go out and find alternative sources of
milk.
Under these circumstances the central planner would very much like to make
sure that the minister controlling milk supplies makes all his deliveries on
schedule. However it is quite reasonable to assume along the lines of our
stylized fact F3 that the minister's rewards depend only on how much he
supplies in a month. Now we know that even if daily supplies from the milk
ministry are quite erratic a lot of the variation will cancel out in the
course of a month and the minister controlling the milk industry may easily
succeed in meeting his monthly targets. In this case he will have no incen-
tive to control the variations in the daily supplies of his ministry. Output
of ice cream will be below the socially optimal level even if the monthly
production of milk and fruits meets the planned targets for those two goods.
The example we have chosen to discuss above is certainly somewhat special
since most other intermediate goods are not as perishable as milk and fresh
fruits. On the other hand the general logic of the argument only depends on
the fact that the accounting system (and the system of rewards based on it)
does not distinguish between a number of products which are not perfect sub-
stitutes. If this was the case the agents (say the ministers) controlling
this group of products will not pay sufficient attention to controlling the
variations in each component of the group which is lumped together (since the
variations cancel out). However from the point of view of the firms using the
goods produced by these firms as inputs this variation will be quite costly
since they will typically have strictly concave production functions. From
the social point of view the result will be excessive variability in the
supplies of inputs and a Lowered productivity of the final goods.
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In Section II of this paper, we introduce a simple model which formalizes
the ideas discussed above. In Section III, we formally establish the results
described above. We find that even in the case where a minister controls only
a finite number of firms, our results continue to hold but only as long as we
can prevent large punishments of ministers.
Section IV of the paper looks at the rationale for using the framework we
use. In particular, we discuss the foundation for using Fl to F4 in our
model. We discuss some empirical justifications but more importantly, also
look at whether we can expect these features to be altered significantly in
the near future. We argue that these features are in face closely connected
with certain fundamental characteristics of centrally planned economies and
therefore are deep-seated characteristics of the system.
We conclude in Section V with some discussion of related work.
II
The Model
Ministers
Input Producing Firms
Central Planner
Ministers
Input Producing Firms
Consumer Good Producing Firms
The above diagram illustrates the structure of our very stylized model of
centrally planned economies. The central planner does not directly control
any firms but is interested only in maximizing the total output of consumer
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M
goods producing firms E C . The production of consumer good m uses N inputs
m=l
X ,, ••, X ,. The production function for consumer goods in each firm is
ml mN
assumed to be C (X ,,.... X „). Each input that is used in the consumer good
m ml mN
industry is produced by a separate input producing firm controlled directly by
a minister who controls all the firms producing that particular type of input.
The Ministers
So far we have not said anything about the minister's preferences or his
controlling activity. Actually we can allow a variety of controlling actions
by the minister; he could be choosing the technologies that the firms under
him use, setting incentive schemes for the managers of these firms or deter-
mining how closely he would monitor the firms. Given any action, a e A. , by
n n
the n minister, the manager and other agents in each firm will respond opti-
mally and generate a (random) output X = X (a ,U ). U is the shock to
ran ran n mn mn
the ra product of the n minister.
We assume that the minister has to put in a certain level of effort to
implement each of these actions and the level of effort V varies with the
action chosen: V = V(a ). For some of the results in this paper, we will not
n
need to specify anything more about the relation between the X ( ) function
mn
and the V( ) function. However in interpreting the results, it will be use-
ful to keep in mind the following structure: imagine the case where the
C ( ) function is of the quadratic type so that only the first two moments of
the random variables X will matter for determining the output of the con-
mn
sumption good.
Now, if we take a to represent the mean of X and s to represent its
mn
variance, we define a 'production possibility frontier' for the minister in
terras of his effort and the mean and variance it generates as H(a,s,V) with
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H. > 0, H < and H_ < 0. Less formally, we assume that the minister can
increase the mean output of each of his firms or reduce the variance of their
output by choosing an action that requires a higher effort. This will be the
case for example if the ministers' choice variable is the amount of monitoring
effort he puts in. If he spends more effort on monitoring, he could make his
firms produce more or produce more reliably.
Structural Assumptions
In the rest of this section, we will make a number of structural assump-
tions which we use to get our results.
Al: Each consumer good producing firm is supplied by only one firm pro-
ducing each type of input and each input producing firm supplies to
only one consumer good producing firm. This assumption essentially
embodies our stylized fact F4.
A2: The outputs of all the firms controlled by each minister have iden-
tical and independently distributed random variables with finite mean
and variance.
A3: The rewards function for each ministry is a Borel measurable
M
increasing function of E X , bounded above and below by numbers
m=l
B and B_ respectively. A part of this assumption embodies our sty-
lized fact F3. The assumption that the function is increasing would
follow if the minister has free disposal of output.
A4: The set of actions available to the minister, A , is finite.
n
The Central Planner's Problem
Under the assumptions we have made for a given size of the ministry, M,
and a given number of ministers, N, the central planners' problem reduces to a
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simple principal-agent problem (with multiple agents) between the central
planner and the ministers.
The central planner maximizes
N
W = Exp[C - E R ] subject to
h=l n
M
C = I C
-i mm=l
C - C (X
,
X ) m = 1, ... , M
m m mi mN
M
R = R ( E X ) n = 1, ... , N
mn mn , mn
m=l
X = X (a *,U ) m = 1, ..., M, and n = 1, ..., N
mn mn n mn
and,
Exp[h(R ) - V(a *)] > U
.
n n
_
rain
where,
a * = arg max Exp[h(R ) - v(a )].
n n n
A
n
V(a ) represents the ministers' disutility of taking that particular action
n
a • h( • ) represents the ministers utility from the reward, and U .
n min
represents the minimum utility that has to be guaranteed to the ministers.
The choice of this very simple structure for our model is influenced by a
desire for clarity and specifity of presentation. However within this rather
restrictive structure we can allow for several different interpretations of
our assumptions and therefore encompass many different aspects of the problem.
For example the different consumption good producing firms in our model may be
consistently interpreted as the same firm at different points of time (this
would be along the lines of our ice cream factory illustration). On the other
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hand the ministries which are assumed to be producing only one good could be
thought of as being just a subdivision of a ministry producing that particular
good. Alternately one can think, of each ministry as producing a number of
different goods which all belong to Che same general category (different types
of ball-bearings for example).
The Large Hierarchy
We have already said that the results in this paper rely on looking at a
case where the minister controls a very large number of very small firms
(actually these could just be divisions of firms producing slightly different
products). In formalizing this idea, we actually look at a sequence of pro-
duction structures where the firms under each minister get smaller and more
numerous but otherwise remain identical. This idea is presented formally
below.
Define X (a ) to represent the random variable X (a ,U ). Then for-
mn n mn n mn
mally, a hierarchy will be given by
H = |n,M,A, , • • • ,A ,X . . . ,X X , . . . ,X , . . . ,X ,V,R . . . ,R ,C }.
1
' 1 Nil Ml 12 mn MN 1 N J
The utility of the central planner is always taken to be the total output of
the final good minus payments to the ministries so it is not specified here.
A simple hierarchy is one in which M = 1. Given a simple hierarchy H, the
infinite sequence of hierarchies generated by H is given by {H
m }m= ,
where,
1) H
}
= H
2) ^ = {N,M,A
1
,...,A
N
,XH ,...,XMN ,V,R 1 ,...,R N ,C
M
}
X
ln
(a
n
)
3) X (a ) has the same distribution as in
mn n M
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hierarchy H for each a e A for n = 1, ..., N and m = 1, ..., MJ
n n
4) C
M (X ,,..., X \ = C(X M...,X Jtt)/M.
ml mN ml mN
As should be evident, the organizing principle of this construction is to
ensure that while the number of firms increases the expected output of each
*
ministry remains the same.
Since for the rest of the paper we will look at the relation between the
central planner and a single ministry, we can simplify notation a little and
drop the subscript. Further, let us introduce the notation X(a) to represent
the random variable X (a) in the simple hierarchy.
In the next section, we will study the structural properties o£ this
model.
Ill
Analysis of the Model
One can directly consider the principal-agent game written out above and
try to say something about the nature of the second best outcome. However, we
chose to proceed in a somewhat indirect way. We first characterize the nature
of the impleraentable set under the assumption that a minister controls a large
number of firms. Then using this characterization, we try to say something
about the second best outcome in a somewhat more specific principal-agent
game.
Theorem 1 tells us what will not be in the impleraentable set. Following
on that, Theorem 2 tells us what will be in that set.
*
In the rest of the paper as M varies, everything varies as in the above
sequence.
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It is convenient to introduce the notation a. > a to denote a. e A is
1 K. L 1
preferred to a_ e A by the ministry faced with a reward function R. Of course
a
q
this preference relation will depend on M.
Theorem 1 : Suppose, A2, A3 and A4 hold. Consider q actions a, , . .
.
,a , . .
.
,
for the ministry. Suppose V(a.) < ... < V(a ) and, E(X(a )) > ... > E(X(a ))
1 Q JL r\
> ... > E(X(a ). Then there exists M* such that M > M* implies a > ...
> a for any R.
R q
Proof : It is sufficient to prove the statement for a. and a . Choose a 6 >
and an e > such that
E(X(a )) - E(X(a
2
))
e < ~ .
The weak law of large numbers implies that there exists M* such that M >
M* implies
P{ | E X(a ) - E(X(a ) ) | > e } < 6 and
ra=l
M
P{ |£ X(a
2
) - E(X(a
2
))j > z\ < 6.
ra=l
This means that,
M M
E(h(R( E X (a„)))) - E(h(R( E X (a,)))) < 6(h(B )-h(B) )
,
, m L , m 1 —
m=l m=l
which can be made arbitrarily small. Since V(a.) < V(a ), the result is
proved. A
In other words for a large enough size of the hierarchy, the iraplementable
set cannot contain any action that is dominated in the sense that there exists
another action which generates a higher mean output for each firm and requires
no greater effort.
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This above result of course simply formalizes the basic intuition we pro-
vide in the introduction. The next result basically tells us that this simple
intuition cannot carry us any further.
Call A' the set of undominated actions on A, i.e. , let a e A' iff a e A
and jf a„ e A such that V(a,) > V(a ) and E(X (a) : E(X (a.)) with one ine-t*2 1—2 ml — m 2
quality strict. Then we prove:
Theorem 2 : Suppose that A' does not contain two actions with equal mean and
effort. Then under assumptions A3 and A4 there exists M* such that M > M*
implies that for each a e A' there exists R that implements a at an expected
cost of no more that t as long as the utility to the minister of taking
action a and receiving t for sure is higher than the utility of taking his
least effort action and receiving B^ for sure, and a and t give the minister
utility greater than U
.
.
min
Proof : Choose a e A' and e > 0. Make sure e is small enough so that if
EX(a') < EX(a) then e < EX(a) - EX(a') for each a' e A*. Set
R(X) = ~t if X > EX(a) - e
=
_B otherwise.
If M is large enough any action a' with EX(a') < EX(a) will lead to a
money payoff of B^ with probability arbitrarily close to one while a will lead
to t with probability arbitrarily close to one. We have assumed that the
effort saved cannot compensate for this money loss so a > a' for large enough
R
M.
Take an a' e A' with E(X)(a') > EX(a). Since a e A', V(a) < V(a*). For a
large enough M the money payoff from either a or a' will be arbitrarily close
to t. So a >£ a » s ince a requires less effort.
A
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As it is easy to see, these results already tell us something about the
attainability of the first best which for emphasis we state as a proposition.
Theorem 3 : If, at the first best, it is possible to achieve the same (or a
greater) expected output for each firm with less effort (but presumably
greater variability of firm output) then the first best is not impleraentable
for a large enough size of the ministry.
The conditions under which this proposition holds are quite weak.. In
terms of the formulation introduced in Section II (see p. 4), it is sufficient
for this proposition that H(m,s,v) is dif ferentiable at the first best.
We have, however, not yet said anything about why the hypothesis of
Theorem 3 should hold. The example given below addresses this question.
Before we look at the example however it will be useful to try to understand
why we should expect the hypothesis of Theorem 3 to hold. Theorem 1 tells us
that given a large hierarchy the minister will essentially care only about his
own effort and the expected output of his ministry. Given that the C( )
functions are strictly concave and given our allocative assumption Al the out-
put of the consumption goods industries would however depend on the entire
distribution of production of the input industries and not just the expecta-
tion. Therefore in the first best the minister should Cake into account
moments of the distribution of output of the firms on his industry other than
the mean. One would therefore expect that at the first best the minister will
find it possible to trade off socially less desirable values of the higher
moments for a lower effort, keeping the expected output the same. The first
best will therefore not be impleraentable.
This however does not prove that the second best outcome would have
excessive input production variability. As we have shown, everything that is
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undorainated is irapleraentable. Clearly there will be options which have a
lower mean output and less output variance than the first best but which also
involve less effort and therefore are undorainated.
The example below sheds some light on when the second best outcome will be
more variable than the first best.
Example
Consider the following economy.
1. Production function of the final good
N N
C = E a.x. - E b.x.
.,11 ._. l l1=1 i = l
c ^ .th
where x. is the amount of the 1 input.
2. The central planner wants to maximize E(C), i.e., the mathematical
expectation of C.
3. Each minister's "production" function is given by the following indirect
relationship
V(x. ,a 2 ) = x2 + (a 2 -a*
2
(x))
2
.li i 11
— 2
Here x. and a. are the mean and variance of the output distribution11 r
generated in each firm controlled by the minister, V is the effort the
*2
minister puts in to generate this mean and variance and a. (x. ) is the
maximum variance option available for that level of x. , with
da. (x.
)
d a. (x.
)
— having either sign but with * > 0.
dx. d"x L
i i
4. We look at the Limit of the sequence of hierarchies defined above so that
each minister essentially controls an infinite number of infinitesimal
firms. The aggregate output of the minister will therefore be x and his
i
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reward (given that random incentive schemes can be ruled out) will be a
deterministic amount R.
5. We assume that the ministers maximize a utility function of the form
/R - V(x. ,a 2 ).
2
In this model in the first best situation, the central planner chooses a.
,
X. and R. for each i to maximize
l i
— 2—2
Za.x. - Eb. (a.+x. ) - ER11 ill l
2 2 2 2
subiect to /R. ~ (x.+(a* -a.) ) - U = V i. The conditions for maximiza-
l ill mm
tion yield, for all i
_*2
- 3
. r „. ,,, *2 2 N2.,„ u i
da:
J(x.) - 4x." + [2b.+4(a*"-at)"+4U . ]x. + b. — a. - 0.
l l l 11 mini l ^— i
i
By contrast, in the second best case, the minister will always chose the
option that generates the highest variance for a given mean output level to
minimize effort. Given this, the central planner chooses X and R. for each
l l
i to maximize
Za.x. - Eb.(o\+x2 ) - ER.11 ill i
subiect to /R. ~ x. - U . =0 for each i which yields,J l l min
H(x.) - 4x. + [2b.+4U
.
]x. + 2b. -=^ a. = V i.
l l l rain i J- dx x
i
Notice also from the first order condition for the first best problem that
*2 2 b . _
a
.
- a . = >
1 1
—2 *2 2 24(x>(a* -a.) + U
.
)ill min
which already tells us that the first best and the second best do not coin-
cide. Further, it is evident that the second best outcome, x. (given by the
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solution to H(x.) = 0) for that particular value of i will be greater than the
L
*
2
_
_
da (x.)
first best outcome x. c (given by the solution to J(x. ) = 0) unless — islf x dx.
i
large and positive.
Thus, we have shown that in our example, under the assumption that
da.
is not a large positive number the second best outcome will display a
dx.
l
larger mean and a larger variance of individual firm output than the first
best outcome. While we do not prove here that this result in more general
4
contexts, our example is relatively general and shows that it is quite
possible in this framework to generate outcomes in which a high aggregate out-
put of the input is accompanied by a highly unreliable supply of it which is
exactly what we had set out to explain.
We now present a number o£ comments about the results in this section.
1. The results above can easily be extended to allow for infinite but
compact action spaces as we show in Banerjee-Spagat (1988).
2. The assumption of independence between the outputs of individual firms
is not necessary. We prove the same results allowing for correlation
between outputs of firms in Banerjee-Spagat (1986).
3. Allowing negative correlation between outputs of firms actually aggra-
vates this problem. This can be seen best where the minister controls
two firms whose outputs are perfectly negatively correlated so that
the total output of the two firms will not vary. The minister who
controls the two firms will therefore not care about the extent of
variability of the output of the two individual firms. (This case is
discussed in greater detail as Example B in Banerjee-Spagat, 1986.)
4. There might be some question about why we prove the results in this
paper using the finite hierarchy case instead of dealing directly with
-16-
the simpler infinite approximation. Our response to this is that the
role of bounded punishments cannot be understood except by con-
sidering the finite case. In the limiting infinite hierarchy since
the aggregate ministry output is deterministic, Theorem 1 holds even
without a bound on punishments. However, if we allow for unbounded
punishments in the finite hierarchy case the limit of the sequence of
second best outcomes as the size of the hierarchy goes to infinity
may be the first best outcome. The intuition for this claim can be
seen by considering the care where the first best action is being
implemented by punishing an outcome which becomes more likely when
one deviates from the first best action. As the size of the hierarchy
gets bigger the probability of using this punishment by mistake
becomes very small and therefore one can make the punishment itself
very large without incurring significantly implementation losses
[see the Appendix for a proof of this claim].
What this makes clear is that the question of which limit to take is a
non-trivial one and starting with an infinite hierarchy is misleading.
IV
Empirical Basis for the Model
We argued before that our model was based on a set of stylized facts
derived from Soviet experience, F1-F4. In this section, we will provide some
evidence for the claim that these are indeed appropriate stylized facts.
Fl, i.e., the existence of ministers is universally recognized and can be
found in any textbook description of the Soviet economy (see for example,
Gregory & Stuart (1981), Nove (1977)). Fedorenko (1986) reports that there
are 50 or so ministers controlling something like 20 million products in the
industrial sector alone not taking account of product differences on the basis
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of timing and location of deliveries. This supports our claim about the large
size of ministries, F2.
F3, i.e., the use of linearly aggregated statistics is equally well
established. While there are 72,000 types of ball bearings in the Soviet eco-
nomy, the central planners' statistics only distinguish between 14 types. So,
on average, each ball bearing statistic the central planner uses is the linear
aggregate of 5,000 numbers (see Karpov (1972)). In fact, the 20 million or
so goods in the Soviet economy are for the purposes of planning aggregated
into only about 2,000 aggregate categories (Fedorenko, 1986) and as the
Hungarian economist Augustinovics says:
"There is a very simple algorithm to reduce total aggregates
of detailed plan information; it is addition [Augustinovics
(1975)]. '*
Finally, stylized fact F4 about the rigidity of the allocation system is also
supported by textbook accounts of the Soviet economy (see for example, Nove
(1977), p. 43-44).
Possible Remedies
The aim of this section is to argue that simple remedies are not available
since the stylized facts Fl to F4 are closely connected with very fundamental
characteristics of a Soviet-type system. We will consider a list of possible
remedies and argue why they may not be feasible.
1. Direct control of firms by the central planner:
The problem with this is simply that the amount of information necessary
to control all the firms in an economy like the Soviet Union is too vast to be
available to any one small group of people and therefore some delegation of
control is inevitable.
-18-
2. Smaller ministers:
This might help somewhat but again the problem is that ministers are large
probably because there are economies of scale in the case of specialized
knowledge and therefore it is efficient to have a certain group of specialists
control a large number of related industries. Making ministers smaller will
be costly in terras of losing these economies of scale.
3. Nonlinear aggregation:
In Appendix B of Banerjee-Spagat (1986) we show that there is a non-linear
aggregation procedure which will yield the first best. However, this kind of
aggregation requires much more information to implement than linear aggrega-
tion. The accountants constructing the aggregates have to be able to
distinguish between each type in the product group being aggregated rather
than just count the total amount of that product irrespective of the specific
type. The costs of changing the aggregation system may therefore be very
large.
4. Allowing firms to choose their supplier:
This would reduce the rigidity of the allocation and make a firm less
dependent on the unreliable supply of one supplier. However, rigid allocation
systems may also have a significant advantage which may prevent their being
replaced easily. The source of this advantage lies in the phenomenon Janos
Kornai calls the soft budget constraint (Kornai (1979 & 1980). According to
Kornai, firms in the centrally planned economies behave as if they face no
binding budget constraint. In the face of a perception of scarcity of input
supplies, firm managers try to stock up with as many inputs as possible
without considering the cost, knowing their costs will be covered by ad hoc
subsidies. Since everybody acts in this same way, there is indeed a scarcity
-19-
of input supplies and the perception of scarcity is confirmed. This kind of
equilibrium with perpetual excess demand is what Kornai calls shortage.
Now, given that this kind of shortage is endemic in centrally planned eco-
nomies, firms will want to take in all the inputs they can get their hands on.
It may then be rational to restrict the sources of inputs available to individ-
ual firms. This is perhaps the basis of the existing rigid allocation system
and if it is, the nature of the allocation system may not change easily.
5. Rewarding ministers on the basis of total projects:
This will not work since, given rigid prices and linear technology, total
profits are actually a linear function of total output and therefore provides
no extra information.
6. Encouraging input receiving firms to take direct action against reliable
suppliers:
A court system has been instituted in the Soviet Union with this in mind
but as Kroll (1986) documents, it is not much used. Fear of reprisals by the
input supplying firms may be part of the explanation. (Spagat (1987) for-
malizes this line of thought in a game-theoretic model.)
Conclusions
The point of this paper was to find an explanation for the extreme unre-
liability of input supplies found in centrally planned economies. We suggest
an explanation based on certain well established characteristics of the
planning system and argue that their characteristics may be hard to remove
without changing the system drastically.
The main actors in our explanation turn out to be ministries. Our story
thus provides a formal basis for the implication of Zaslavaskaya (1983) and
-20-
Gorlin (1985) that ministries are too big and too powerful. At a more general
level this result also provides some intuition as to why a 3-level hierarchy
is qualitatively different from a 2-level hierarchy.
Our analysis also allows us to make some predictions about the structure
of the impact of shortage. Specifically our model suggests that the impact of
shortage would be most severe in industries where the elasticity of substitu-
tion between inputs is low (see Banerjee & Spagat (1987)). The framework
developed in this paper can also be used to study other problems. In a com-
panion paper (Banerjee-Spagat (1987)) we use this model to discuss the issue
of the productivity growth slowdown in the Soviet Union.
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FOOTNOTES
See Kornai (1980), Levine (1966) and Davis & Charemza (forthcoming).
2
See Holzraan (1970) and Hunter (1961) for early studies.
3
For excellent descriptions of the institutional features of the Soviet
economy, see Nove (1977) and Gregory and Stuart (1981).
4
See Banerjee & Spagat (1986).
The notion that ministries are evaluated according to linear aggregates
is implicit in Linz (1986) and Berliner (1983). It is more explicit in
Grossman (1960).
See Kornai (1957) and Nove (1958) for early analyses of the problem of
aggregation.
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Appendix
One assumption that we see as being crucial is the assumption of bounded
punishment. It is easy to see where this assumption is necessary for our
results. What is more interesting however is that while in our model in
general the larger the size of the hierarchy the more difficult it gets to
reach the first best, with unbounded punishments a larger hierarchy may
actually bring us closer to the first best.
The intuition of this result comes from an observation of Mirrless (1974)
to the effect that if suboptimal actions generate output distributions with a
left tail weight that is very high relative to the left tail weight of the
distribution generated by the optimal action then an approximate first best
can be implemented by inflicting very large punishments on agents with very
low outputs. A version of this Mirrlees condition can arise naturally in
large hierarchies as we show in the next theorem.
Theorem 4 - Suppose there is no bound on how much a minister can be punished.
Consider a finite action space A with an optimal action a* for the Central
Planner. Suppose that for each a e A, X(a) has a continuous density f(x,a)
with support on [0,1]. If f(0,a) > f(0,a*) for every a t a* then a first best
can be approximated arbitrarily closely for large enough M.
Proof - Claim: For each e > there exists M(e) and X such that M > M(e)
implies
M -
P{ I X (a) < X}
m »! m . f(0,a) M(1 ) ____ >
_
M
" £ *
P{ E X (a*) < X} f(0 ' a
*
}
-1 mm=l
-A2-
This is because,
M - MX MX-X MX M
(2) P{ E X (a) < X} = f / ... J - E X dF(X,a)...dF(X a)
•i ™ n n n -i m * Mm=l m=l
but for MX near zero, the right hand side of (2) is approximately,
f (0 a i (MX* ji iu, ; v^ ) for any a SQ che left hand side of (1) does indeed go to infinity
M
!
as n -> °° at the rate indicated.
This result allows us to choose a sequence of punishment utilities
M -
(Vm=i such that V p ( E x(a * } < V _> °
ra=l
M - _
and q «P{ E X(a) < X } -> —M l M
m=l
for each a t a*. For example, choose X decreasing to zero and set
M
M
-
_
q = -M/P{ E X(a) < X }. So for large M the incentive schemeM . M
ra=l
m=l m=l
= q otherwiseM
will enforce an approximate first best.
A
To make the intuition of this result clear consider a case where the
minister has two actions. X(a*) is zero with probability -r and one with
3 1 1
probability -r. X(a) is zero with probability -r and two with probability —.
Then
-A3-
M
P'{ Z X (a) = 0} ,1 *
M _ l M*
P{ E X (a*) = 0} (4)
-1 mm=l
M —
We can set q = -M(2 ) and X^ = and enforce an approximate first best.
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